Modulation of emotional appraisal by false physiological feedback during fMRI

BACKGROUND James and Lange proposed that emotions are the perception of physiological reactions. Two-level theories of emotion extend this model to suggest that cognitive interpretations of physiological changes shape self-reported emotions. Correspondingly false physiological feedback of evoked or tonic bodily responses can alter emotional attributions. Moreover, anxiety states are proposed to arise from detection of mismatch between actual and anticipated states of physiological arousal. However, the neural underpinnings of these phenomena previously have not been examined. METHODOLOGY/PRINCIPAL FINDINGS We undertook a functional brain imaging (fMRI) experiment to investigate how both primary and second-order levels of physiological (viscerosensory) representation impact on the processing of external emotional cues. 12 participants were scanned while judging face stimuli during both exercise and non-exercise conditions in the context of true and false auditory feedback of tonic heart rate. We observed that the perceived emotional intensity/salience of neutral faces was enhanced by false feedback of increased heart rate. Regional changes in neural activity corresponding to this behavioural interaction were observed within included right anterior insula, bilateral mid insula, and amygdala. In addition, right anterior insula activity was enhanced during by asynchronous relative to synchronous cardiac feedback even with no change in perceived or actual heart rate suggesting this region serves as a comparator to detect physiological mismatches. Finally, BOLD activity within right anterior insula and amygdala predicted the corresponding changes in perceived intensity ratings at both a group and an individual level. CONCLUSIONS/SIGNIFICANCE Our findings identify the neural substrates supporting behavioural effects of false physiological feedback, and highlight mechanisms that underlie subjective anxiety states, including the importance of the right anterior insula in guiding second-order "cognitive" representations of bodily arousal state

Modulation of emotional appraisal by false physiological feedback during fMRI

BACKGROUND James and Lange proposed that emotions are the perception of physiological reactions. Two-level theories of emotion extend this model to suggest that cognitive interpretations of physiological changes shape self-reported emotions. Correspondingly false physiological feedback of evoked or tonic bodily responses can alter emotional attributions. Moreover, anxiety states are proposed to arise from detection of mismatch between actual and anticipated states of physiological arousal. However, the neural underpinnings of these phenomena previously have not been examined. METHODOLOGY/PRINCIPAL FINDINGS We undertook a functional brain imaging (fMRI) experiment to investigate how both primary and second-order levels of physiological (viscerosensory) representation impact on the processing of external emotional cues. 12 participants were scanned while judging face stimuli during both exercise and non-exercise conditions in the context of true and false auditory feedback of tonic heart rate. We observed that the perceived emotional intensity/salience of neutral faces was enhanced by false feedback of increased heart rate. Regional changes in neural activity corresponding to this behavioural interaction were observed within included right anterior insula, bilateral mid insula, and amygdala. In addition, right anterior insula activity was enhanced during by asynchronous relative to synchronous cardiac feedback even with no change in perceived or actual heart rate suggesting this region serves as a comparator to detect physiological mismatches. Finally, BOLD activity within right anterior insula and amygdala predicted the corresponding changes in perceived intensity ratings at both a group and an individual level. CONCLUSIONS/SIGNIFICANCE Our findings identify the neural substrates supporting behavioural effects of false physiological feedback, and highlight mechanisms that underlie subjective anxiety states, including the importance of the right anterior insula in guiding second-order "cognitive" representations of bodily arousal state

Intergroup emotional exchange: Ingroup guilt and outgroup anger increase resource allocation in trust games

Intergroup exchanges are an integral part of social life but are compromised when one group pursues its interests at another group’s expense. The present research investigates whether expressing emotion can mitigate the negative consequences of such actions. We examine how emotions communicated by either an ingroup or outgroup member following an ingroup member’s breach of trust affect other ingroup members’ feelings of guilt and pride, and subsequent allocation of resources. In both studies, groups of participants played a two-round trust game with another group. In round one, they observed a member of their own group failing to reciprocate a trusting move by the outgroup. In Study 1 (N = 85), an outgroup member then communicated anger or disappointment, whereas in Study 2 (N = 164), an ingroup member then communicated happiness or guilt. Comparisons with no-emotion control conditions revealed that expressions of outgroup anger and ingroup guilt increased participants’ allocations to an outgroup member in round two. The effect of an outgroup member’s anger expression was mediated by participants’ diminished feelings of pride about the ingroup action, whereas the effect of an ingroup member’s guilt expression was mediated by participants’ own feelings of guilt. Taken together, these findings support a social appraisal approach and highlight the roles that pride and guilt can play in shaping intergroup resource allocations

Emotion recognition as a social act: the role of the expresser-observer relationship in recognizing emotions

There is abundant evidence both from the scientific literature as well as from everyday experiences that people are generally quite capable of inferring emotions from the face. But what does it mean that people are able to recognize others’ emotions? We first reflect on the question of how we can determine what is ‘accurate’. We distinguish between conceptualizing emotion recognition as a cognitive performance task or as a social act. In the first conceptualization, emotion recognition is considered an ability of matching patterns, in principle devoid of the social context, whereas in the latter conceptualization, we take into account that observers and expressers interact and have explicit or implicit knowledge about each other’s goals and motives, which influences what they ‘perceive’. Based on social functional theories of emotion and theories on emotional intelligence, adequately recognizing emotions in daily life should be related to successful social functioning. However, reviewing the evidence on the relation between emotion recognition and social competence, studies using standardized emotional recognition tests as part of more general emotional intelligence tests have not consistently found a positive association with aspects of social competence. We believe that this is mainly due to the way in which emotion recognition has been conceptualized and operationalized. Cognitive performance tasks using a match-mismatch paradigm seem less predictive of social competence than emotion recognition tasks that are more socially sensitive. The goal for future research is to develop tasks that better tap these social aspects of emotion recognition